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Abstract
We provide an explanation for why estate taxation is surprisingly little used, given
the skewness of the estate distribution. Taxing estates implies meddling with
intra-family decisions, which is frown upon by many. At the same time, given
the concentration of estates a small proportion of the population stands to gain a
lot by decreasing estate taxation. We provide an analytical model, together with
numerical simulations, where agents bequeathing large estates make monetary
contributions in order to play up the salience of the encroachment aspects of
estate taxation on family decisions and to decrease its political support.
Keywords: estate taxation, family values, political economy, lobbying, Kan-
tian equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Whereas wealth inequality has, on the whole, trended downwards in the 20th
century, we have recently witnessed sharp reversals in a number of countries, the
most striking example being the United States.1 Moreover, the distribution of
inherited wealth is much more unequal than that of wealth in general. Given
the extreme skewness of the distribution of inherited wealth, one would assume
that a majority of households would be in favor of nancing part of public ex-
penditure/redistribution with a tax on inheritance. Yet, such a tax is not popular
and one rather observes a continuous erosion of wealth transfer taxation in many
OECD countries, and especially in the U.S.2 How to explain this apparent paradox
is the question at the heart of this paper.
Focusing on the U.S., our line of explanation relies on the observations that a
small number of very wealthy individuals make large contributions to think tanks
and lobby groups whose objective is to repeal the federal estate tax, and that
these groups often underscore the fact that estate taxation meddles with intra-
family decisions. As Tabarrok (2012) writes: «So long as men are mortal, wealth
must be transferred between the generations and so long as parents care for their
children, the dominant means of doing so will be through family inheritance. The
transference of wealth through family benets bequeather and heir, strengthens
family ties, and increases long-term savings. When the state intervenes in this
process, it increases its co¤ers at the expense of the smooth operation of family,
society, and economy» . Cunli¤e et al (2012) further state that inheritance taxes
are viewed with suspicion because they threaten family solidarity and unity, at
the especially sensitive time of the death of one of its members.
Graetz and Shapiro (2005) and Lincoln et al (2006) describe the campaign
1See Davies and Shorrocks (2000) and more recently Piketty and Zucman (2013).
2Cremer and Pestieau (2012).
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of the super wealthy to kill the estate tax. These super wealthy have reported
nearly half a billion dollars in lobbying expenditures from 1998 to 2006, and stand
to save upward of 70 billion dollars in case of a repeal of the estate tax. They
also nance think tanks and outside groups that produce ad campaigns intended
to sway public opinion against the estate tax (Lincoln et al, 2006, p8). An
example of such an outside group is The American Family Business Institute, a
trade association of family business owners, farmers, and entrepreneurs. This and
other organizations invest large amount of money to educate Congress, the media
and the public about the costs of the estate tax in order to build pressure for a
permanent repeal.
The gist of our paper is that wealth concentration makes it possible and at-
tractive for a small fraction of the population, the super wealthy, to play up the
encroachment on family decisions of estate taxation in order to draw down its
political support. We model this situation as a contribution game, where very
rich people endow organizations whose objective is to increase the salience for
voters of family concerns, and thus to dampen their support for estate taxation.
To do so, we use the concept of Kantian equilibrium, and the modeling proposed
by Roemer (2006, 2010). We obtain numerically that the majority chosen estate
tax rate is signicantly decreased at the Kantian equilibrium contribution game,
and we provide some comparative statics analysis. A striking result we obtain is
that average donation per contributor increases when fewer people contribute.
2 The model with exogenous salience of family
values
We consider an economy with a continuum of individuals i who di¤er in their
endowment wi which is distributed according to the positively skewed cdf F (wi);
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so that the average endowment, w, is larger than the median one, wmed. Each
individual has a child she cares for and allocates her endowment between con-
sumption ci and bequest bi. The government taxes bequests at a proportional
rate  and uses the tax proceeds to produce an amount a of public good, with the
following government budget constraint
a = 
Z
bidF (wi): (1)
The utility of a parent is given by
Ui = u(ci) + v(di) + a  '(); (2)
where u(ci) is the utility obtained from ones own consumption and v(di) is the
utility derived from the endowment of the unique child, with both functions in-
creasing and concave.3 The last term in (2) reects the salience of the concerns
that estate taxation encroaches on family decisions (family concernsfrom now
on). This term is the product of the salience of this dimension, measured by   0,
and of the concerns themselves, measured by the function ' which is increasing
and convex in . This formulation embodies two assumptions: (i) the family con-
cerns ' depend on the value of the estate tax rate, but not on the amount of tax
paid by the individual, and (ii) the multiplicative form assumed between salience
 and concerns ' means that all agents have identical disutility from the fact that
estate taxation encroaches on intra-family decisions.
We study the following three stage setting. In the rst stage, the parameter
 is endogenously determined through the intensity of an advertising campaign
of the wealthy, as described below in section 3. In the second stage, all parents
3This specication is often used in models where individuals are concerned with their own
consumption and the initial endowment their children will benet from. A classic reference for
this is Glomm and Ravikumar (1992). The component v(di) can be justied by some form of
imperfect altruism.
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vote over the value of the estate taxation rate . In the third stage, each parent
chooses the amount of bequest bi she wants to leave to her o¤spring, and then
enjoys the amount of public good a described by the government budget constraint
(1). Children do not take any decision.
We solve the game by backward induction, starting with the choice of bequest
bi for given values of the estate taxation rate  and of the salience of family values
.
2.1 Individual bequest choice
An individual with endowment wi expects her child to have an endowment reect-
ing a process of regression towards the mean, plus the net-of-tax bequest that she
leaves to her child, so that
di = wi + (1  ) w + bi(1  ); (3)
while ci = wi   bi.
The individual bequest is obtained by maximizing (2) with respect to bi, which
yields
@Ui
@bi
=  u0(ci) + v0(di)(1  )  0;
so that the individually optimal bequest level is a¤ected by the estate tax rate 
(assumed exogenous at this stage) but does not depend on the salience of family
concerns, .
Assuming logarithmic utilities u(:) and v(:) from now on, the rst-order con-
dition (FOC) for bi becomes
(1  )ci  di:
Agents with a low endowment would prefer to leave a negative bequest, which is
not allowed. To obtain the threshold parental endowment w^() below which the
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individual optimal bequest is nil, we solve the following equation:
@U
@bi
jbi=0 = 0;
so that
w^() =
(1  ) w
1     :
Note that w^() increases with , with w^(0) = w and thus w^() > w when  > 0.
Since w > wmed; a minority of agents leaves a bequest whether the tax on bequest
is positive or nil. This is in accordance with stylized facts. Note that w^() tends
toward 1 as  tends towards 1  : nobody leaves bequest for   1  .
When wi > w^(), the FOC for an interior solution for bequests is
(wi   bi)(1  ) = wi + (1  ) w + bi(1  )
or
bi =
w(1     )  w(1  )
2(1  ) (4)
=
w
2
  w + (1  ) w
2(1  ) ;
where a star denotes the individually optimal level of the variable. We then
obtain that bequests increase with income and decrease with taxation: as taxation
increases, the set of (rich) agents who leave a bequest shrinks and they all leave
smaller bequests.
We now move backward to the second stage decision, namely majority voting
over the tax rate :
2.2 Voting over the estate tax rate
Since we have already established that a majority of voters (including the me-
dian income parent) never leaves a bequest, whatever the values of  and , we
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immediately obtain that the Condorcet winning value of  (i.e., the value that
is preferred by a majority of voters to any other feasible value) is the one most-
preferred by the individual with the median endowment, wmed.4 The FOC for her
most-preferred estate tax rate, denoted by V , is then given by
@a
@
  '0(V )  0: (5)
The decisive voter compares the marginal benet of the estate tax (the increase in
the amount of the public good a) with its marginal cost (in terms of the salience
of family concerns). If family concerns of the estate tax have no salience ( = 0),
the decisive voter chooses the value of  that maximizes the tax proceeds. This
value is interior since, as we have seen, no one leaves a bequest if   1   . It
is straightforward that V decreases as  increases. If the salience parameter  is
large enough, the decisive voter may prefer no estate taxation at all, even though
she does not contribute while she enjoys the public good.5
We now move to the rst stage of the game where the salience of family
concerns is determined.
3 The setting of the salience of family concerns
We now assume that the salience parameter  can be a¤ected by the intensity
with which voters are faced with messages (such as media reports, interviews, talk
shows, etc.) stressing that estate taxation encroaches on intra-family decisions.
These messages are produced by think tanks and similar organizations, which are
4Alternatively, we can show that preferences are single-crossing in  (see Gans and Smart
(1996)) so that the median income agent would remain decisive even if a majority of parents
were to leave a bequest. The proof of this statement is available upon request from the authors.
5For simplicity, we assume in the rest of the paper that V > 0 (so that (5) holds with
equality), in accordance with the numerical results obtained in the last section.
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funded by high income individuals. More precisely, we assume that agents with
an endowment above some exogenous value, denoted by ~w, contribute voluntarily
to nance these organizations. We denote by ei the contribution of an agent
with endowment wi, so that the per capita (in the overall population) amount of
contribution, e, is given by
e =
1Z
~w
eidF (wi): (6)
We do not model explicitly the process by which these contributions a¤ect
the salience of this issue, but rather assume that the salience parameter is an
increasing and concave function of the per capita contribution, (e):
All agents with wi  ~w decide simultaneously how much to contribute, an-
ticipating the impact of the resulting per capita contribution on the majority
chosen estate tax rate. Our point in this paper is not to emphasize the free riding
problem among rich agents in this contribution game. We rather concentrate on
the Kantian equilibrium of this contribution game, as modeled by Roemer (2006,
2010). A Kantian equilibrium is such that no contributor would like to see all
contributors (including himself) vary their (positive)6 contribution by the same
(positive or negative) percentage.7 We write the utility function of a contributor
i with endowment wi as a function of her contribution ei, the vector of all other
individualscontributions, e i, and of the common multiplicative factor r as
Ui(rei; re i) = Log(wi   bi   rei) + a(V ) (7)
+Log(wi + (1  ) w + (1  V )bi )  (e)'(V );
6There is always a trivial equilibrium where no one contributes, so that a proportional vari-
ation of the individual contributions does not change anything.
7We interpret the Kantian equilibrium concept as a cooperative norm: see Roemer (2010)
and the references quoted there for a justication as well as a history of this concept in the
economic literature, starting with La¤ont (1975).
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where V is the majority chosen value of  in the next stage, given by (5) with
 = (re) and where e is given by (6). A vector of contributions ei for all
individuals i with wi  ~w is a Kantian equilibrium if the utility function (7) is
maximized for all contributors when r = 1.
Two important comments are in order. First, the majority chosen value of
 is the one emerging from voting when the salience parameter is (re) for the
decisive voter. At the same time, we assume that, when considering variations
in their contribution to the lobbying campaign, the contributors do not a¤ect the
salience of the family dimension of estate taxation for themselves, which explains
why the last term of (7) is (e)'(V ) rather than (re)'(V ). In other words,
rich agents contribute in order to change the salience of the family issue for the
decisive voter, but variations in their own contributions do not a¤ect the salience
of the issue for themselves (which would be weird). Observe that, at a Kantian
equilibrium, all agents (including the contributors) share the same valence given
by (e). One can view this situation as a long term equilibrium, where everybody
is alike in the salience of family values, and where the salience of these values is
supported by the contributing behavior of a fraction of high income individuals
in society.8
Second, we assume that the bequest decision of agents with wi  ~w is not
a¤ected directly by the amount of contribution they makei.e., that bi is given
by the FOC (4) for all agents.9 Given that the contribution of wealthy indi-
8Alternatively, we could model the salience of the family issue for the contributors as (0)
i.e., as if contributors were immune to their own propaganda. We would then obtain that
contributors would put less salience on the family dimension, at equilibrium, than the rest of
the population. This would not change the function V (re) as long as ~w > wmed, since the
median endowed agent would remain the decisive voter, with the same preferences as above.
9In the absence of this assumption, increasing all contributions ei proportionately would
decrease the bequests of all contributors (because this would increase the marginal utility cost
of the bequest) and would a¤ect the shape of the government budget constraint (1). This would
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viduals is small compared to their wealth/bequest (see Lincoln et al, 2006), and
that their marginal utility of consumption is already low and unlikely to be very
much impacted by the relatively small contribution, this simplifying assumption
seems quite innocuous. We verify the benign character of this assumption in our
numerical simulations (see footnote 17).
We then have
@Ui(rei; re i)
@r
jr=1 =  ei
ci
+ e
@V
@e

a0(V )  (e)'0   b

i
di

= 0; (8)
where
@V
@e
=
0(re)'0
a00()  '00 < 0;
by the FOC and SOC for V . The rst term in (8) is the marginal utility cost of
the contribution for agent i. The purpose of this contribution is to decrease the
tax rate V . Using the FOC for V , we can reformulate (8) as
@Ui(rei; re i)
@r
jr=1 =  ei
ci
  b

i
di
e
@V
@e
= 0: (9)
The rst two terms in the square bracket of (8) cancel out because the majority
chosen value of  equalizes the marginal disutility due to family considerations
with the marginal increase in public good amount. As the rst term of (9) is nil
when no one contributes, we obtain by continuity that (9) is positive for small
values of ei provided that bi > 0 and that '
0 > 0 when  = V (0): there is an
incentive to contribute a positive amount, since the marginal cost of contributions
tends to zero for very small contributions, while the benet does not if the family
concern function is su¢ ciently convex, and if the individual leaves a bequest at
the tax rate that is majority chosen in the absence of contributions.10
We obtain the following proposition.
make both the analytical and numerical solving of the Kantian equilibrium much more complex,
without any comparable gain in intuition.
10This implies that ~w must be large enough so that this last condition is satised.
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Proposition 1 At the Kantian equilibrium, individual lobbying contributions are
an a¢ ne and increasing function of income.
Proof. Integrating ei over wi 2 [ ~w;1[ in (9), while making use of the FOC for
bi (so that (1  )ci = di), we obtain that the Kantian equilibrium is such that
1  V =  @
V
@e
1Z
~w
bidF (wi);
while the FOC for ei then simplies to
ei =
 e
1  V
@V
@e
bi > 0;
so that the contribution is the same fraction of the bequest for all contributors.
Since bequests are an a¢ ne function of income (see FOC (4)), the individual
contribution is an a¢ ne and increasing function of income as well.
Before providing a numerical illustration, we show how our results are impacted
by the introduction of an income tax.
4 Extension: Introducing income taxation
In this section, we add a proportional income tax on the endowment, at rate  ,
whose proceeds (together with the proceeds from the bequest tax) fund the public
good. To keep the model as close as possible to the version developed until now,
we keep the assumption that endowments are exogenous, but we assume that
(unmodelled) distortions created by the income tax reduce the amount of income
tax proceeds. We have
ci = (1  )wi   bi;
a = 
Z
bidF (wi) + () w;
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with 0()  1 and 00() < 0 so that 0() is positive for  low enough but may
become negative when  is large enough.11 The utility of the parent remains given
by (2) with the child endowment di given by (3). Unlike estate taxation, income
taxation is not a¤ected by family concerns, so that the function  remains the
same as in previous sections, with sole argument the estate tax rate .
The timing of the model is unchanged: a subset of agents decide rst about
their lobbying contributions to a¤ect the salience of the concerns that estate tax-
ation encroaches on family decisions. Agents then vote over both the estate tax
rate  and the income tax rate  . Finally, they observe the resulting tax rates and
choose how much they bequeath to their child. We solve this game by backward
induction, as previously.
In the last stage, proceeding as in section 2.1 above, and with straightfor-
ward modications of notation, we obtain that the smallest endowment leaving a
positive bequest is
w^(; ) =
(1  ) w
(1  )(1  )  ;
with the bequest, when positive, given by
bi =
wi
2
  ( + (1  ))wi + (1  ) w
2(1  ) : (10)
Observe that w^ increases with  while bi decreases with  . Intuitively, income tax-
ation discourages bequests (both at the extensive and intensive margins) because
it increases the marginal utility of consumption, and thus the marginal utility
cost of bequeathing. Estate taxation  also decreases bequests, and a majority of
agents leaves no bequest, whatever   0 and   0, as previously.
11In the absence of the distortions summarized by the function (), individuals would prefer
using the non-distortive income tax to the distortive bequest tax. Introducing explicitly the
distortions generated by the income tax, for instance through endogenous labor supply, would
complicate the analysis without bringing much new insight.
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We then move backward to the second stage choice of  and  by majority
voting. As we will show shortly, a majority of individuals (those who do not
leave a bequest) shares the same preferences over  , and also over . Whether
agents vote simultaneously over pairs (; ) or separately (at the same time, or
sequentially) over  and over  then does not matter, since the most-preferred
pair of tax rates of all agents who do not bequeath is selected at equilibrium in
all these procedures. For pedagogical reasons, we rst study the majority chosen
estate tax rate as a function of the (exogenous) income tax rate, denoted by
V (), and the majority chosen income tax rate as a function of the (exogenous)
estate tax rate, denoted by V (). This allows us to study and comment the
substitutability/complementarity between the two taxes.
Since a majority of agents leaves no bequest, the formula for the FOC for  is
the same as in section 2.2 and given by (5). The value of  satisfying (5) is then
the majority chosen equilibrium V ().
The most-preferred value of  of an agent with income wi is given by
@Ui
@
=
@a
@
  wiu0(ci)
=
@a
@
  wi
(1  )wi   bi   ei
= 0: (11)
For the majority of agents who leaves no bequest and do hence not contribute to
lobbying, this FOC simplies to
@Ui
@
=
@a
@
  1
(1  ) = 0; (12)
where the marginal benet of taxation (a larger amount of public good) equals its
marginal utility cost. With our logarithmic utility function, the marginal utility
cost of taxation is the same for all income levels who do not bequeath, so that
they all share the same most-preferred value of the income tax rate, which then
becomes the majority chosen one, V ().12
12Hence, with logarithmic utilities, the only reason to favor income taxation is the nancing of
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The next lemma studies the substitutability between the two taxes, at the
majority voting equilibrium for each tax separately.
Lemma 1 The two taxes (on estate and on income) can be either substitute
(@V =@ < 0 and @V =@ < 0) if @2a=@@ < 0 or complement (@V =@ > 0
and @V =@ > 0) if @2a=@@ > 0.13
The estate and income taxes can, at this level of generality, be either substitute
or complement because they both a¤ect bequests at the intensive and at the ex-
tensive margins (i.e., modifying the set of agents who do leave a positive bequest).
The rest of the paper is then agnostic as to whether taxes are substitute or not.
We will show in section 5 that they are substitute in our numerical simulations.
We then obtain the majority chosen tax pair (S; S) as the result of the Shepsle
procedure (see De Donder et al., 2012), where S = V (S) and S = V (S). This
pair corresponds to the most-preferred tax rate pair of all agents who leave no
bequest.
We now move to the lobbying equilibrium. The main di¤erence with section
3 is that the lobbying contributions a¤ect both the majority chosen income and
estate tax rates, S and S. We show in the following lemma how these tax rates
are a¤ected.
Lemma 2 Lobbying contributions decrease the majority chosen estate tax rate
(@S=@e < 0) and increase (resp., decrease) the majority chosen income tax rate
the public good, and not redistribution. With functional forms other than Log and generating a
redistribution motive i.e., where the most-preferred value of  is decreasing in income withe
median income individual would be decisive when choosing  . This would not a¤ect qualitatively
our results, since this individual is also decisive when voting over .
13The proofs of all formal statements in this section are to be found in the Appendix.
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if both taxes are substitute (resp., complement):
@S
@e
> 0 if
@V
@
< 0;
@S
@e
< 0 if
@V
@
> 0:
Recall from above that V is a¤ected directly by e (see (5) with  = (e))
while V is not (see (12)). Larger lobbying contributions raise the salience of
family issues for the estate tax and unambiguously result in a lower estate tax.
If both taxes are substitute (resp., complement), the majority chosen income tax
rate then increases (resp., decreases) with lobbying contributions.
The FOC for the individual lobbying contribution at the Kantian equilibrium
of agents with wi > ~w becomes
@Ui(rei; re i)
@r
jr=1
=  ei
ci
+ e
@S
@e

@a
@
  (e)'0   b

i
di

+ e
@S
@e

@a
@
  wi
ci

= 0;
which we simplify by using the FOCs for S and S to obtain
@Ui(rei; re i)
@r
jr=1
=  ei
ci
  e@
S
@e
bi
di
+ e
@S
@e

1
1    
wi
ci

= 0; (13)
where ci < (1 )wi for wi > ~w since agents who contribute to lobbying also leave
a bequest (since ~w > w^), so that the square bracket in the last term is negative.14
The rst term in (13) measures the marginal utility cost of increasing lobbying
contributions, while the two other terms measure the utility consequences of the
variations in tax rates induced by these increased contributions. Increased con-
tributions decrease the estate tax rate, which benets contributors in proportion
14As in section 3, we assume that ei is small enough, compared to wi, not to a¤ect the
individual bequest bi , which is given by (10). See footnote 9.
14
to the amount they bequeath. Also, agents who bequeath favor a smaller income
tax rate than the majority chosen value (see (11)) because they have a larger
marginal utility of consumption than those who dont leave bequests. The weight
they put on variations in S induced by higher contributions is then increasing in
the amount they bequeath. If both taxes are substitute, S increases with e and
the last term in (13) constitutes a cost of higher contributions, while it constitutes
a benet if both taxes are complement so that S decreases with e.
We now show that Proposition 1 is robust to the introduction of income tax-
ation.
Proposition 2 At the Kantian equilibrium of the model with estate and income
taxation, individual lobbying contributions are an a¢ ne and increasing function
of income.
We now report some numerical simulations. They do not pretend to constitute
a calibration, but rather an illustration of the magnitude of the forces at play in
our model.
5 Numerical results
We assume that the endowment is distributed according to a lognormal distribu-
tion with mean 60 and median 50 (roughly corresponding, in thousand dollars,
to the US household income distribution). We assume that  = 0:5, so that the
endowment of a child is a simple average of the parents endowment and of the
average endowment in the economy. We use the following functional forms for the
family concerns, '() = 26=5, for the salience function, (e) = 0:1+20Log(1+2e),
and for the distortions generated by income taxation, () = (1  4).
Figure 1 shows the majority chosen equilibrium tax rates (S; S) as a function
of the exogenous lobbying contributions. In other words, we solve the model from
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the second stage on, assuming exogenous values of e. We represent the results of
four computations, which we connect with a curve. The top left point corresponds
to the case where  is set arbitrarily at 0. The majority voting equilibrium then
corresponds to the summit of the Dupuit-La¤er curve. Moving to the right on
the curve in Figure 1, we report the majority voting tax rates when e is set
exogenously at, respectively, 0 (so that  = 0:1), 0.02 (i.e., 20$ per capita for the
whole population, which results in  = 0:884) and 0.05 (with  = 2). We see that
the curve is downward sloping, meaning that the two taxes are substitute. We
also see that the impact on S of increasing e is very small, while the impact on
S is, intuitively, much larger, with S decreasing from 9% to 0.3% as we increase
the per capita lobbying contributions from 0 to 50$.15
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
We then solve the entire model and study the Kantian equilibrium for di¤erent
values of ~w, and we report the results in Figure 2. We compute three Kantian
allocations corresponding to lobbying contributors belonging to the top 20%, top
10% and top 5% of the income distribution, respectively. We report on Figure 2
the per capita contribution e and the value of S at the Kantian equilibrium (S
is basically una¤ected by the changes in ~w), and we connect the three allocations
with a curve. We then obtain positive lobbying contributions for all three equilib-
ria, which decrease the equilibrium estate tax rate S from 9% (when e = 0, see
Figure 1) to 1.6% when only the top 5% of the income distribution contribute,
1.1% when the top decile contributes, and 0.9% when the top 20% contribute.
Per capita contributions (in the whole population) vary from 29$ when the top
15All results reported in this section are qualitatively similar when  is set exogenously at
zero, except that equilibrium estate tax rates are slightly larger, which makes sense given that
the estate tax is then the only way to fund the public good.
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5% of the income distribution contribute to 37$ when the top 20% do contribute.
We then obtain that enlarging exogenously the set of contributors (from the top
5% to the top 20% of the income distribution) increases their total lobbying con-
tributions and thus means that they are collectively more e¤ective at inuencing
the estate tax rate. At the same time, the average contribution per contributor
(as opposed to per capita in the whole population) decreases when we enlarge the
set of contributors, from 590$ when the top 5% contribute, to 350$ when the top
10% contribute, and to 190$ when the top 20% contribute.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
We nally move to the depiction of individual lobbying contributions, as a
function of income, in the three Kantian allocations studied - see Figure 3. We
see that individual contributions are indeed a¢ ne and increasing in income, as
shown in Proposition 2.16 We also see that individual contributions are increasing
with ~w (for those with w > ~w), and that the slope @ei =@wi is also increasing with
~w.17 Contributors react to an exogenous shrinking of the set of contributors by
increasing their individual contributions but, as we have seen, these increases are
not large enough to compensate for the lower fraction of contributors and result
in a smaller per capita contribution e, and thus in a larger equilibrium estate tax
rate.
16The contribution of the agent with w = ~w = 80 such that F (80) = 0:8 is close to zero,
indicating that 20% is close to the maximum proportion of contributors at any Kantian equilib-
rium. If we were to expand the set of contributors to people below the 8th decile of the income
distribution, these agents would not leave a bequest large enough to make it worthwhile to pay
lobbying contributions.
17The individual contributions remain very low even for rich agents (700$ at most for agents
with a 200 000$ income), so that our assumption that individual bequests are not directly
a¤ected by individual contributions is reasonable.
17
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
6 Conclusion
We have presented an explanation for why estate taxation receives so little popular
support even though most people would not pay this tax. Our approach is based on
the observations that many people see any wealth transfer tax as an encroachment
on the free working of families and that this feeling is reinforced by an intense
activity from organizations nanced by contributions from the very wealthy. This
is not the only explanation but it might be as convincing as others, such as the
POUM (prospect of upward mobility) hypothesis, according to which relatively
poor people oppose high rates of redistribution because of the anticipation that
they or their children may move up the income ladder (Benabou and Ok, 2001).
Our modelling approach is parsimonious, and would gain from being extended to
the case of a progressive estate tax (for instance with a tax applied above a certain
threshold, as is often the case in practice), or to a dynamic context with perfect
altruism. We leave these extensions for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Direct application of the implicit function theorem on the FOC for  (5), using
the fact that the SOC is negative, shows that
@V
@
s
=
@2a
@@
:
Similarly for  , we have
@V
@
s
=
@2a
@@
:
We have that
@a
@
=
1Z
w^(;)
bi dF (wi) + 
1Z
w^(;)
@bi
@
dF (wi)
 bi (w^)
@w^
@
f(w^);
so that
@2a
@@
=
1Z
w^(;)
@bi
@
dF (wi)  bi (w^)
@w^
@
f(w^) (14)
+ 
1Z
w^(;)
@2bi
@@
dF (wi)
 f(w^)
"
@bi
@
@w^
@
+
@ @w^
@
bi (w^)
@
#
:
The rst line of (14) is negative, the second is nil, while the square bracket in the
last line simplies to
(1  ) w2(1  )2
  (1  )(1  ) < 0
since w^ > 0. Hence the sign of @2a=@@ is ambiguous.
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Proof of Lemma 2
We denote the FOC for  (5) as FOC and the FOC for  (12) as FOC .
The pair (S, S) is then the solution of the following system of two equations:
(FOC = 0, and FOC = 0). Using the implicit function theorem applied to this
system, we obtain that
jHj =

@FOC
@
@FOC
@
@FOC
@
@FOC
@

=
@FOC
@
@FOC
@
  @FOC
@
@FOC
@
> 0
since (S, S) jointly maximizes Ui. We then have
@S
@e
=  jH1jjHj ;
with
jH1j =

@FOC
@e
@FOC
@
@FOC
@e
@FOC
@

=
@FOC
@e
@FOC
@
> 0
so that
@S
@e
< 0;
while
@S
@e
=  jH2jjHj ;
with
jH2j =

@FOC
@
@FOC
@e
@FOC
@
@FOC
@e

=  @FOC
@
@FOC
@e
;
so that
@S
@e
s
=  @FOC
@
s
=   @
2a
@@
:
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Proof of Proposition 2
Integrating ei over wi 2 [ ~w;1[ in (13), while making use of the FOC for bi (so
that (1  )ci = di); we obtain that the Kantian equilibrium amount of e is such
that
1  S +
1Z
~w
bi dF (wi)

@S
e
+
1  S
1  S
@S
e

= 0;
while the FOC for ei then simplies to
ei =  ebi

@S=@e
1  S +
@S=@e
1  S

;
so that the contribution is the same fraction of the bequest for all contributors.
Since bequests are an a¢ ne function of income (see (10)), the individual contri-
butions are an a¢ ne and increasing function of income as well.
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Figure 1 : Majority chosen tax rates (τS,θS) as a function of 
(exogenous) per capita lobbying contributions 
F(w~)=0.8
F(w~)=0.9
F(w~)=0.95
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
0.025 0.027 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.039
τ
S
Per capita lobbying contributions  e,̅ 
Figure 2: Kantian equilibrium (e,̅  τS) as a function of w~
Figure 3 : Kantian individual contribution ei as a function of income wi,
when the set of contributors belong to the top 5   w  135, in dashed red,
the top 10   w  108.5, in thick blue and the top 20   w  83, in green
of the income distribution
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